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                Date: 2000-12-13
                 
                 
                Cyber-Crime: GILC Aufschlag II
                
                 
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      Der nächste Anlauf gegen einen der unverschämtesten  IT- 
Vertragsentwürfe seit dem [US] Communications Decency  
Amendment anno 1996 ist öffentlich.  
 
Wir wünschen der Kritik eine recht hohe Verbreitung in den  
Medien & insbesonders im Bereich der so genannten IT &  
Telekom-Wirtschaft, die sich neuerdings & immer mal wieder  
"Business Community" nennt. 
 
Zwischen dem Dealen, Schachern, Zocken & sonstiger  
Produktivität empfiehlt es sich, auch hie und da zu gucken,  
ob sich strategisch nicht veritable Geschäfts/hinder/nisse an  
die Wände menetekeln. 
 
Die da wurden entworfen von einer Allianz aus gesetzlich  
ermächtigten Behörden & ermächtigenden Juristen &  
anderen Bürokraten, aus analogen Lobby/isten & allerhand  
Verbindungsleuten zu allerhänderen Diensten. Allesamt  
ehrenwerte Mitglieder ihrer jeweiligen Gesellschaft & dort in  
leitender Position. 
 
Background: 
http://www.quintessenz.at/archiv/
                   
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Global Internet Liberty Campaign Member Letter on Council  
of Europe Convention on Cyber-Crime Version 24.2 
 
December 12, 2000 
 
Dear Council of Europe Secretary General Walter  
Schwimmer and COE Committee of Experts on Cyber Crime, 
 
On October 18, 2000 we wrote a letter on behalf of a wide  
range of civil society organizations to indicate our opposition  
to the proposed Convention on Cyber-Crime. In that letter we  
raised our opposition to issues surrounding criminalisation of  
tools, the issue of liability, sanctions on copyright, enhancing  
mutual legal assistance, and increased investigative powers.  
We argued that version 22 of the convention represented the  
interests of law enforcement, and lacked accountability. As a  
result, its lack of consideration towards civil liberties was  
appalling. 
 
To our dismay and alarm, the convention continues to be a  
document that threatens the rights of the individual while  
extending the powers of police authorities, creates a low- 
barrier protection of rights uniformly across borders, and  
ignores highly-regarded data protection principles. 
 
Although some changes have been made in version 24-2, we  
remain dissatisfied with the substance of the convention. The  
convention subcommittee did give our previous letter  
attention, but we maintain that protections of individual rights  
have not been attended to adequately. We question the  
validity of the process that still endures a closed environment  
and secrecy. As a result, we are following up with this  
subsequent letter to reiterate our past concerns, address  
some of the changes, and shed more light on a subset of  
these concerns. 
 
Exceptions indicate a larger problem 
 
One thematic shift in the convention is the increased number  
of exceptions and caveats in the current draft. While, these  
exceptions are still quite weak, it appears as though there is  
rising concern within the CoE as to the powers granted within  
the convention. 
 
The effect of the deletion of Article 37.2 (from version 22), that  
once limited the amount of flexibility signatory states are  
allowed to exercise, appears as though there is an arising  
opposition among the drafters and plenary member states  
over this issue. In Section 2 on Investigative Techniques,  
article 14.2 was added to assure "adequate protection of  
human rights and, where applicable, the proportionality of the  
measures to the nature and circumstances of the offence."  
While the CoE considered allowing signatory states to  
restrict the situations for using the new investigatory powers,  
even from using them in the crimes established in the  
convention, this was not included in version 24-2. The  
convention still promotes use of invasive techniques for any  
crime, except the use of interception, which according to  
21.1 can only be used for "serious offences to be determined  
by domestic law". Even this limitation serves little effect, for  
the definition of serious crime is left to domestic law, and  
some countries in the CoE have an extremely broad definition  
of serious crime for content interception purposes. An  
additional exception was appended to Articles 29 and 30, for  
consistency with a previous article, that a signatory state  
may refuse mutual assistance to pursue an offence only if  
the state in question considers the offence to be political.  
Despite that this option existed in another article in version  
22, and is consistent with previous  
CoE documents, it does appear that the CoE is aware of the  
differences in regimes and qualitative nature of 'offences' in  
the prospective-signatory states. This exception arises  
because of the failure to require dual-criminality. The addition  
of sub-article 35(bis).4 states that a transferring party may  
require the receiving party to explain the use made of  
information that is shared between states. This after-the-fact  
reporting is desirable, but not sufficient. The interests of  
proportionality and specificity must also be addressed in  
requirements applicable to the initial requests for assistance,  
sufficient to allow the requested party to verify the reason for  
the investigation by the requesting party. When a state  
makes such 'reservations', article 43 contains new sub- 
articles to place pressure on these states to conform to the  
full powers of the convention. Subarticle 43.2 claims that  
signatory states are expected to withdraw reservations "as  
soon as circumstances permit", while subarticle 43.3 allows  
the Secretary General to approach these states periodically  
to discuss the withdrawal of their reservations. The CoE  
appears to assume that human rights are negotiable,  
periodically. 
 
Alles  
http://www.gilc.org/privacy/coe-letter-1200.html
                   
 
 
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edited by  
published on: 2000-12-13 
comments to office@quintessenz.at
                   
                  
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